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THE PERFORMANCE PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS INFLUENCING
ALTERNATIVE DIMENSIONS AND VIEWS OF PERFORMANCE

Abstract: There is a large literature on the determinants of organizational performance,
and its multi-dimensional nature is well-recognized. However, little research examines how
different organizational and environmental factors influence different stakeholders’ performance
assessments of the same service. We address this gap by comparing the factors influencing
performance evaluations by different constituencies of child care centers in Ohio. We
operationalize performance using: (1) regulatory violations documented during state licensing
inspections, (2) satisfaction with the center’s quality reported by center directors, (3) satisfaction
with the center’s quality reported by teachers, and (4) satisfaction with care quality reported by
parents. Our findings suggest that different organizational and environmental factors are
associated with the performance assessments of different constituencies. In addition, some of
these constituency assessments appear to influence each other.

INTRODUCTION
Organizational performance has been a key concern for public administration scholars
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2008; Boyne 2003; Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, and Walker
2005; Brewer and Selden 2000; Meier, O’Toole, Boyne, and Walker 2007; Moynihan and
Pandey 2005; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Selden and Sowa 2004). It is broadly accepted that
performance is a complex phenomenon with a range of different dimensions viewed from the
perspectives of diverse stakeholders (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Boyne et al. 2005;
Boschken, 1992, 1994; Brewer and Coleman 2000; Cameron, 1978, 1981, 1982; Kaplan and
Norton 1992; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981, 1983; Rojas 2000; Selden and Sowa 2004). In public
management research, these dimensions have been translated into numerous alternative measures
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2006; Selden and Sowa 2004; Walker and Boyne
2006), and there is a large literature on the determinants of performance (Boyne 2003; Brewer
2006; Brewer and Selden 2000; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999).
However, little research examines whether different organizational and environmental factors
influence different stakeholders’ performance assessments of the same service.
This article improves our understanding of the complex nature of organizational
performance by investigating the relationship between a set of organizational and environmental
characteristics and numerous service outcomes evaluated by different constituencies. Focusing
on nonprofit and for-profit child care centers operating under Head Start contracts in Ohio, we
operationalize performance using: (1) regulatory violations documented during state licensing
inspections, (2) satisfaction with the overall quality of the center reported by the center directors,
(3) teachers’ satisfaction with the overall quality of the center, and (4) parents’ satisfaction with
the overall quality of the child care. We explore a range of factors that may be related to each of
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the four performance assessments provided by the following key constituencies: regulators,
senior managers, line staff, and clients.
We begin by exploring various conceptualizations of organizational performance and
discussing organizational constituencies and what this implies for performance measurement.
Specifically, we detail past research suggesting that different constituencies assess performance
differently and that the factors influencing different constituencies’ assessments of various
organizational characteristics differ as well. We also draw on the public management literature
to identify the ways in which various factors might affect different constituencies’ performance
assessments in this study. Next, we use multivariate regression analysis to examine the influence
of environmental and organizational factors on performance. We conclude by discussing the
implications of our findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptualizations of Organizational Performance. Scholars have conceptualized
organizational performance in many different ways. The Goal Attainment Model of
organizational performance defines effectiveness as the extent to which an organization achieves
its goals (Etzioni 1964; Miles 1981; Price 1972). Several scholars have challenged this model,
pointing out that organizations often pursue a range of different (and sometimes conflicting)
goals (Boschken 1992, 1994; Campbell 1977; Poister 2003; Rainey 1997). Quinn and
Rohrbaugh (1983) propose a model of performance, the Competing Values Framework, which
combines the Goal Attainment Model with performance theories stressing internal organizational
health (Bennis 1966; Likert 1967) and ability to exploit external resources and opportunities
(Yuchtman and Seashore 1967). Quinn and Rohrbaugh argue that effective organizations
balance and manage four alternative performance models and that organizations shift their
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emphasis among these models as they move through various life cycle stages. Finally, Connolly,
Conlon, and Deutsch’s Multiple-Constituency Model (1980) argues that whether or not an
organization is doing a good job is contingent upon who is answering the question rather than on
objectively verifiable or “internal” aspects of performance. Organizational constituencies have
diverse needs, and none of their perspectives are more “correct” than others.
Reflecting this conceptual pluralism, public management research has identified many
ways to measure performance (Boyne et al. 2005; Hatry 2006; Poister 2003). The assessments
of performance can vary on a continuum from more objective to more subjective. Objective (or
objectively verifiable) are traditionally viewed as the “gold standard” of public management
(Andrews et al. 2006). However, objective measures have their weaknesses and sometimes fail
to fully capture different dimensions of performance (Andrews et al. 2006; Boyne 2002). They
reflect the judgments of powerful groups about what data should be collected (Andrews et al.
2006; Walker and Boyne 2006). Hence, some scholars argue that organizational performance is
socially constructed and that all measures are ultimately subjective (Brewer 2006; Brewer and
Selden 2000). Objective measures are also frequently selected based upon availability and ease
of measurement (Andrews et al. 2006, Chun and Rainey 2005). In short, both political
preferences and technical limitations can undermine the validity of objective measures.
Subjective measures of performance represent stakeholders’ perceptions of various
aspects of organizational activities (Andrews et al. 2006; Brewer 2006; Brewer and Selden 2000;
Selden and Sowa 2004; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; Walker and Boyne 2006). Such measures
represent a balance of outputs and outcomes and can offer a more global view of organizational
well-being (Moynihan and Pandey 2006). On the other hand, subjective measures often suffer
from common-method bias caused by the tendency of respondents to give similar responses to

3

distinctive survey questions (Andrews et al. 2006; Brewer 2006; Brewer and Selden 2000;
Walker and Boyne 2006). Another weakness is that subjective measures rely on recall and
respondents may lack a comprehensive understanding of organizational issues (Golden 1992).
Aside from the subjective-objective dichotomy, performance measures have been
differentiated using several other criteria. Measures may be based on the judgments of internal
or external stakeholders (Walker and Boyne 2006). They can reflect organizational inputs,
outputs and/or outcomes (Cohen and Eimicke 2008; Linder 2004). Finally, performance data
can be quantitative and/or qualitative (Blasi 2002). Although theoretically these diverse
approaches to measurement provide a more complete picture of organizational performance,
different measures may not be complementary empirically, for instance, due to important
differences in performance data, reflecting certain managerial tradeoffs.
Dimensions and Views of Performance. In addition to detailing various approaches to
measurement, the literature identifies different dimensions of performance (such as costs, quality,
equitable access, and regulatory compliance) and different constituency views of performance
(such as the perspectives of clients, managers, and regulators). The distinction between
dimensions and views of performance is theoretically important here since we incorporate both
concepts into this research. Some past studies focus on different dimensions of performance,
suggesting that evaluation of public agencies may vary depending on what dimension is used.
For instance, Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) examine 17,000 skilled nursing facilities and determine
that assessments of nursing home performance diverge based on whether service quality or
access to the poor is examined. Levy (2001) and Cameron (1978) also find that organizations
can perform well in terms of some dimensions of performance but poorly in others.
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Other studies emphasize a variety of external and internal constituencies that public and
nonprofit organizations serve and focus on their views of organizational performance.
Constituency values, training, motivation, political ideology, interests and cognitive abilities
shape constituencies’ use of performance information (Moynihan 2006), and their views of
performance vary accordingly. 3 For instance, Tsui (1990) finds significant differences in how
executives, managers, and employees rated the effectiveness of human resource subunits: the
ratings of executives were the highest while the ratings of the employees were the lowest. As
another example, Provan and Milward (1995) collected data from a variety of stakeholders to
evaluate the effectiveness of mental health networks and find that the assessments of different
stakeholders vary. Addicott and Ferlie (2006) and Kelly and Swindell (2002) also find similar
results. Taken together, these findings suggest that organizations may be forced to make
tradeoffs between priorities valued by different constituencies when trying to meet their
performance goals (Boschken 1992, 1994).
This study focuses on three dimensions of performance, reported from four perspectives.
The first dimension – regulatory violations – reflects centers’ compliance with regulations
evaluated by government inspectors. The second dimension is the overall quality of the child
care center, evaluated by two constituencies – center directors and teachers. Assessments of this
dimension are likely to reflect broader center-level phenomena such as organizational culture and
work environment, physical conditions, operations, the achievement of strategic priorities and
client outcomes. Finally, the third dimension of performance, the overall quality of child care, is
3

There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that different constituents assess organizational characteristics
other than performance differently, too. Enticott, Boyne, and Walker (2009) report that there are significant
differences in how three organizational echelons in English local government authorities assess organizational
structure, culture, strategy formulation, and strategy content. Like Tsui (1990), these researchers find that senior
staff are more likely to provide positive assessments of their organization than lower-level staff. Phillips (1981) also
finds that variation in informant position explains a significant portion of the variation in informant assessments of
several different organizational characteristics.
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assessed by the parents. While assessing care, parents are likely to focus on the care their child
receives and its impact on their child’s development. Care quality, evaluated by the parents, is
just one aspect of the overall center quality, evaluated by the teachers and the center directors.
Factors Influencing Constituencies’ Assessments. The literature on different
constituencies’ views of organizational performance provides limited empirical evidence on how
different factors influence their assessments. In Tsui’s study (1990), the set of environmental
context variables had the greatest impact on executives’ effectiveness ratings, while the set of
adaptive response variables had the greatest impact on the employees’ ratings. Both
environmental and adaptive variables influence the managers’ assessments. While Tsui’s focus
is similar to ours, its generalizability to a public setting may be limited because two of the three
organizations in Tsui’s study were for-profit. Performance measurement is more complicated in
public and nonprofit organizations because they do not emphasize a single dimension of
performance and lack an equivalent to the private sector’s “bottom line” (Andrews et al. 2006).
In addition, public and nonprofit organizations often provide complex services with intangible
outcomes that are hard to quantify and measure. Finally, public and nonprofit organizations also
tend to experience more political pressures and transparency demands from various external
constituencies.
While no other past research compares the factors affecting general performance
assessments by different constituencies in public and nonprofit organizations, some studies
examine this issue in regards to other organizational characteristics. Walker and Brewer (2008)
find that the factors influencing perceptions of red tape vary significantly across different
echelons within English local authorities. Walker and Enticott (2004) also find a significant
variation in the factors influencing managerial reform values and actions at different government
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echelons. Building upon this research, our study compares the factors influencing performance
assessments by different constituencies in a child care setting. Our next section sets the stage by
examining the policy context under consideration. The following section then proposes a model
of organizational performance based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature.
HEAD START CONTRACTS IN OHIO
Our study focuses on the performance of community child care centers that receive Head
Start funding. The Head Start program was initiated in 1965. Implemented in all fifty states, it
helps fund comprehensive child development programming to preschool children of low-income
families. The national Head Start program is administered by local Head Start agencies (often
structured as community action agencies). In Ohio, local Head Start agencies receive grants
from their Region 5 multi-state Head Start office and can form contracts with for-profit and
nonprofit child care centers. The purpose of these partnerships is to replace the part-day, part
year schedule traditionally offered by Head Start with a full-day, full-year child care option.
Child care in these centers is considered “Head-Start-enhanced” through the financial and inkind assistance from the Head Start agencies. The Ohio State Department of Job and Family
Services (ODJFS) monitors private child care providers, including the contracted child care
centers examined in our study. Data from the ODJFS inspections is one of the performance
measures we use.
DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
This section explores the relationships between a number of independent variables and
four measures of organizational performance. While the theoretical literature on performance
determinants mostly focuses on a more general conceptualization of organizational performance,
our hypotheses focus on how the determinants are related to each of our four measures of
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performance: (1) regulatory violations documented during state licensing inspections, (2)
satisfaction with the overall quality of the center reported by the center directors, (3) teachers’
satisfaction with the overall quality of the center, and (4) parents’ satisfaction with the overall
quality of the child care. Our independent variables are categorized into four groups:
organizational capacity, organizational traits, the contract relationship,4 and control variables.
Organizational capacity is an important determinant of performance (Forbes and Lynn
2005; Goerdel 2006; Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2003; Moynihan and Pandey 2005).
Adopting Moynihan and Ingraham’s perspective (2003), this study considers its numerous
dimensions, including internal management capacity. In the literature, internal management
capacity has been approached as a broad term5 encompassing activities such as identifying goals
and strategies, creating and implementing financial, IT, and HR management systems (including
systems related to staff motivation and feedback), planning or restructuring organizational
activities, managing performance, resolving internal conflicts, and buffering the external
environment (Boyne 2003; Boyne et al. 2005; Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000; O’Toole
and Meier 1999). The general organizational performance literature finds a positive association
between good management practices and organizational performance (Boyne 2003; Brewer and
Selden 2000; Donahue et al. 2000; Hou et al. 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2002; Moynihan and
Pandey 2005). A review of these and other studies suggests that the overall impact of
management ranges from 8% to 10% of outcomes in stable programs (Boyne et al. 2005).
Although many studies suggest that sound management improves performance, some studies
suggest that the impact that different measures of management capacity have on organizational
4

The third group of variables, contract relationship design, is specific to the contracting context of this paper.
Meier and O’Toole, who use a related term “management quality,” note that “a measure of managerial quality
should be general; it should be related to a wide variety of organizational outputs” (Meier and O’Toole, 2002, p.
640).
5
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outcomes varies. For example, Pitts (2005) finds little evidence of management diversity
affecting student outcomes, while management representation improves test results and dropout
rates; notably, the effect sizes were somewhat different for each. Similarly, Selden and Sowa
(2004) find that IT systems and staff’s perception of management infrastructure had a negative
effect on children’s school readiness, while management’s investment in mission, staff training
and feedback had a positive impact.
How would the child care administrators’ utilization of sound management practices –
monitoring teaching quality, providing teachers with regular feedback and evaluating programs –
affect our four outcomes of interest? First, we expect to observe a negative effect on the number
of violations: capable managers will be more likely to invest their time and effort in explaining
the regulations to staff and keeping them motivated and accountable for their compliance. In
terms of the managers’ assessments of quality, we hypothesize that capable managers will be
more skilled at identifying performance problems and making timely improvements and hence
will be more satisfied with their center’s performance. Good managers also clearly articulate
organizational goals, seek feedback, and empower staff by providing the resources and structures
to help improve performance. As a result, higher management capacity is likely to improve
teachers’ satisfaction with the overall center quality. Finally, more capable managers prioritize
customer satisfaction and focus on the aspects of services important to their clients. Hence, we
expect to find a positive effect on parental assessments as well.
Financial resources are another aspect of organizational capacity expected to improve
performance although scholars recognize that available resources have to be efficiently managed
in order for them to positively impact service outcomes (Boyne 2003). While there is a broad
consensus predicting a positive association between financial resources and performance, there is
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actually only a moderate amount of evidence supporting this claim; most empirical studies,
including those focusing on the effect of per pupil spending, find financial resources do not have
a significant effect on performance (Boyne 2003).
Consistent with past theoretical predictions, we hypothesize that resource rich
organizations will have more administrative staff and technical capabilities to oversee regulatory
compliance with physical environment, safety, staff qualifications, and instruction standards.
Thus, financial resources may help reduce the number of regulatory violations. Additional
finances also provide managers with more flexibility in addressing environmental or operational
challenges and more freedom to explore innovative instructional practices, make capital
improvements, and acquire cutting edge resources. These factors may positively affect managers’
perceptions of center quality. Additional financial resources may also translate into a better
physical environment, greater access to teaching tools, and more generous compensation for
teachers. These resources are likely to improve teachers’ satisfaction. Finally, financial
resources properly invested into center structures and processes should improve the quality of
care a center provides, positively impacting parental satisfaction.
Human resources, or what Boyne (2003) refers to as “real resources,” are also considered
to be a key predictor of program outcomes and are typically hypothesized to improve
performance. Contrary to expectations, the general literature on organizational performance
mostly finds that real resources, commonly measured as staff quantity and quality, have an
insignificant effect on service quality, customer satisfaction, efficiency and other program
outcomes (Boyne 2003). However, within the literature specific to child care outcomes, there is
limited empirical evidence suggesting that increased real resources are positively associated with
performance: Selden and Sowa (2004) report that staff training expenditures are positively
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related to child care program outcomes. In our study, we include three measures of real
resources: the percentage of teachers with a B.A., the percentage of teachers with an M.A. and
the student-to-teacher ratio. We expect that working in a center with a larger number of welltrained teachers may reduce teacher burnout, therefore resulting in teacher satisfaction with
center quality. Another advantage of these centers is that teachers will have more time and the
educational background to aid management in program implementation, thus improving the
managers’ satisfaction. These centers also may have more satisfied parents. Lower student-toteacher ratios and the presence of better trained teachers provide greater opportunities for
students to receive individualized attention, supervision and care, all likely to translate into better
parental assessments. Unlike the other three performance measures, we expect real resources to
have a mixed impact on violations. Regulators closely monitor child care center staffing levels,
and centers with lower student-to-teacher ratios are more likely to be in compliance with these
regulations. On the other hand, regulators focus on basic health and safety regulations and are
not concerned with whether teachers have advanced degrees. As a result, we do not expect there
to be an association between teachers’ education and the number of regulatory violations.
In addition, we investigate the impact of several organizational traits: size, ownership,
affiliation with an umbrella organization, and client characteristics. The literature provides little
consistent evidence on how organizational size impacts performance (Boyne 2003). While
larger contractors may benefit from economies of scale, red tape prevalent in larger organizations
can negatively impact performance by hampering innovation (Moynihan and Pandey 2005).
Also, smaller organizations may be more likely to create a nurturing and intimate environment
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2008). Reflecting this mixed evidence, we hypothesize that impact of size
on different constituencies’ assessments of performance will vary. Large centers will be more
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likely to use standardized procedures which may help reduce violations. On the other hand,
teachers and parents may be more satisfied with smaller centers because these centers will be
less bureaucratic. Children in smaller centers may be more likely to receive services tailored to
their unique needs, and teachers may be able to focus on providing quality care rather than
complying with cumbersome procedures. With respect to the last performance measure –
directors’ satisfaction – there are both challenges and advantages associated with managing large
and small centers, so we expect to find no association between size and managers’ satisfaction.
We also explore the impact of ownership status and specifically examine whether
nonprofit centers perform better than their for-profit counterparts. Shareholders of for-profit
organizations financially benefit whenever costs are reduced, including when these savings result
in poorer service quality (Eggleston and Zeckhauser 2002; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). In
contrast, nonprofits cannot reward their shareholders but must invest any profits into activities
that will advance their mission (Cohen 2001). Consequently, there is less incentive for
nonprofits to cut costs by reducing service quality (Amirkhanyan 2010). Nonprofits may also be
more mission-driven which may increase staff motivation and result in improved performance
(Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). Like Amirkhanyan et al. (2008), we believe that nonprofit status
will generally have a positive association with performance. However, we expect that nonprofit
ownership will impact the performance assessments of some constituencies more than others.
For example, the emphasis nonprofits place on their missions may result in these organizations
having better working environments for their employees and being more focused on delivering
high quality care and meeting client needs. As a result, both teachers and parents affiliated with
nonprofit child care centers may be more satisfied. On the other hand, we do not expect
nonprofit status to impact the number of regulatory violations. Regulators are focused on basic
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health and safety regulations and are not concerned about ownership status. We also predict that
there will be no association between nonprofit status and managers’ satisfaction because
managing a nonprofit child care center in comparison to a for-profit one has both advantages and
disadvantages depending on a number of other environmental and organizational factors.
In addition, we investigate whether the faith-based status of nonprofit organizations
influences performance. Faith-based organizations may not perform as well as their secular
counterparts if their ability to hire qualified staff is hampered by certain mission-related
constraints (Ebaugh, Pipes, Chafetz, and Daniels 2003) or if dependence on volunteers
negatively impacts staff turnover, professionalism and expertise (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and
Lambright 2009). Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that the staffing quality and
stability at faith-based child care centers may be inferior to those in the secular centers, reducing
managers’, teachers’ and parents’ satisfaction. In contrast, we hypothesize there will be no
association between faith-based status and the number of violations. Similar to our argument
regarding nonprofit status, regulators are focused on basic health and safety within organizations
and are not concerned with their religious affiliation.
Another organizational trait scholars who study organizational performance have focused
on is network participation (Boyne 2003). As an example of an important network link, this
study examines the impact of affiliation with an umbrella organization. Organizations with
umbrella-affiliates may perform better compared to their freestanding counterparts because of
the benefits they receive from standardization and economies of scale (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008).
At the same time, it is possible that these organizations will perform more poorly because
managers lack the flexibility to implement strategies designed to improve performance
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2008). Consistent with this perspective, empirical research on nursing
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homes suggests that chain affiliation and service quality have a negative association (Harrington,
Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, and Himmelstein 2001; O'Neill, Harrington, Kitchener, and
Saliba 2003). Mirroring the mixed literature on this topic, our hypotheses on the impact of
affiliation vary by constituency. Centers affiliated with umbrella organizations will be more
likely to use standardized procedures that help reduce regulatory violations. At the same time,
affiliation with a larger organization may be associated with less managerial discretion (Rainey
and Steinbauer 1999). In such settings, managers may feel constrained in terms of their ability to
make strategic changes and to define the center’s direction, which would decrease their
satisfaction. Teachers may also be less satisfied working for centers affiliated with larger
organizations if they have less flexibility to design their curriculum and shape their classroom
environment. Finally, increased standardization at the umbrella-affiliated centers may result in
children receiving less individualized attention, reducing parental satisfaction.
Like many other performance studies (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008; Goerdel 2006; Meier
and O’Toole 2002, 2003; Selden and Sowa 2004), we examine client characteristics. We
consider the percentage of white students and the percentage of subsidized students at a center.
These two variables are intended to measure the percentage of children from vulnerable
backgrounds attending a center, reflecting the fact that poverty and racial inequities often create
service delivery challenges in educational settings (Jencks and Phillips 1998). We hypothesize a
negative association between the percentage of vulnerable clients a center serves and all four
performance measures. Centers serving a higher percentage of vulnerable clients will be under
greater financial stress because the fees that the center is able to charge will be lower, and
parents will be less likely to pay their bills. Directors at these centers will spend more time
trying to improve the financial solvency of the center and less time on services. These pressures
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may decrease their satisfaction with the care their centers provide. It may also be more difficult
for the teachers to do their jobs effectively if a high percentage of students are from vulnerable
backgrounds. Teachers may have to spend more time assisting the students struggling with
education and behavioral issues. Consequently, outcomes for all students at the center regardless
of their background may be worse, negatively impacting performance assessments made by
directors, teachers and parents. The challenges created by having vulnerable clients may also
distract staff attention from regulatory compliance, ultimately resulting in more violations.
Finally, parents may have a negative image of centers serving a high percentage of
disadvantaged clients regardless of the true quality of care provided.
The community child care centers in our study have contracts with local Head Start
agencies, and hence the contracting relationship a center has with Head Start may impact its
performance. One aspect of the contract relationship often considered in the literature is the
degree of trust and cooperation between the two parties (Artz and Brush 2000; Macneil, 1974,
1978, 1983; Sclar 2000). In this study, we explore the effect of relationship strength on
performance. In the instances of a strong contracting relationship, the local Head Start program
and child care center will have open communication channels, agree on key goals and processes,
and base their actions on trust and cooperation. This may lessen a contractor’s opportunistic
behavior and reduce the need for monitoring. If the local Head Start program chooses to reinvest
these savings into the service delivery system, contractor performance may be further improved.
We hypothesize that strong contracting relationships will have a direct and positive effect
on directors’ assessments of quality. Center directors are most likely to be responsible for
managing Head Start contracts and are likely to be more knowledgeable than other staff about
the nature of the contracting relationship as well as the relationship’s strengths and weaknesses.
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Directors involved in partnerships that have a shared understanding of Head Start goals,
participatory procedures, and cooperative program implementation will have a clearer
understanding of the Head Start agency’s expectations and will see these expectations as more
meaningful. They will also be better able to tailor their service delivery system to meet Head
Start goals. On the other hand, the strength of contracting relationships should not have a direct
impact on teacher and parent assessments of care because these constituencies’ awareness of
contract-related matters is more limited. Similarly, we do not expect the strength of the
contracting relationship to influence centers’ regulatory compliance because the ODJFS, not the
local Head Start agency, is responsible for monitoring adherence to state child care regulations.
Another aspect of contracting influencing contractor performance is completeness – the
extent to which the terms of agreement are formally specified. Here, competing hypotheses can
be proposed. On the one hand, completeness can contribute to goal clarity and agreement,
minimize conflict and positively affect constituency satisfaction. It may also make it easier for
the principal to hold an agent accountable (Romzek and Johnston 2005). At the same time, as
formalization increases, more resources may need to be devoted to contract specification,
negotiation and monitoring (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2010; Boukaert and Peters
2002). From the agent’s perspective, staff will have to devote more time to the administrative
tasks and fewer resources may be available for core programmatic activities, negatively affecting
performance (Amirkhanyan et al. 2010).
While both hypotheses are plausible when predicting contractor performance in general
situations, we believe only the latter hypothesis is applicable in this study given its specific
policy context and measures: we predict that there will be a negative association between
contract completeness and directors’ and teachers’ satisfaction. By including relationship
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strength in our model as another independent variable, we are already assessing whether the local
Head Start program and child care center have shared expectations. Therefore, contract
completeness in this context measures whether having shared expectations recorded in official
documents rather than shared expectations communicated through informal channels influences
performance. Child care providers (a) deliver a “soft” service with outcomes that are relatively
difficult to measure, (b) serve vulnerable clients (who are unable to monitor and report problems),
and (c) have professional values that are not likely to be fully shared by public funders. These
considerations contribute to the contractors’ need for flexibility and use of professional judgment.
This setting is consistent with DeHoog’s (1990) description of collaborative contracts where the
two sides understand they cannot record all possible contingencies and must have an open mind
and willingness to work together as new problems arise. In such settings, official documentation
outlining the processes and the outcomes is likely to generate conflict. For these reasons, we
hypothesize that increasing contract completeness will negatively affect directors’ and teachers’
assessments of center quality. We also expect that contract completeness will not affect parent
satisfaction or regulatory violations. Both the parents and the ODJFS – the public agency
responsible for monitoring adherence to state regulations – are unlikely to have much knowledge
of the contracts between Head Start and local child care centers.
As a final aspect of the contract relationship, we examine relationship length, measured
as the length of time the child care center has had a contract with their local Head Start agency.
Again, this association is complex, and the impact that relationship length has on different
constituencies’ assessments may vary. On the one hand, principles and agents are likely to
develop shared goals in longer relationships which could positively impact agents’ performance
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2010). Managers working for centers with longer ties to Head Start may
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better understand Head Start’s goals and tailor their services to those goals, increasing director
satisfaction with center quality. On the other hand, principals may become complacent about
monitoring long-term contracts (DeHoog 1990), which may result in declined contractor
performance. Complacent managers may fail to communicate regularly with Head Start
representatives, which would compromise their ability to meet contract expectations and
negatively impact managers’ assessments. Hence, the impact of relationship length on directors’
assessments is unclear. Teachers, parents and regulators, unlike center directors, are likely to
have little or no involvement with the contracting process. Therefore, we argue that relationship
length will not influence performance assessments made by these constituents. The only effects
on teacher or parent satisfaction would likely be realized indirectly through internal operations.
In summary, our model outlines a set of key factors hypothesized to affect performance.
Table 1 details our theoretical predictions. Note that regulatory violations are a negative
measure of performance. We expect the impact that several predictors will have on performance
assessments will vary by constituency.
<Table 1 about here.>
METHODS
Data. Our data come from the Partnership Impact Research Project (PIRP), a threeyear survey of education partnerships in Ohio.6 In this article, we used four PIRP data sets:
1. The Child Care Center Data Set contains information on nonprofit and for-profit
child care centers. The data is provided by the center directors and focuses on the
population served, services, funding sources, and other major characteristics of

6

The formal title of the data set is ICPSR04298-v1, 2001-2004 available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04298.v1. From 2001 to 2004, the Education Development Center conducted a
three year study to evaluate the partnerships among Head Start agencies and private child care centers and assess
child care quality and access to child care services in Ohio.
.
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contractors. The original data was constructed by stratifying licensed child care
centers in Ohio. The study team first divided the centers into two groups: centers
partnering with Head Start, and those who are not. Then, centers were further
stratified by urbanicity. From the stratified sample, 221 eligible child care centers
were randomly selected, and 141 of them agreed to participate in this survey. In the
first round data set, 78 child care centers have a partnership with a local Head Start
agency in Ohio while 63 centers do not. The number of respondents varies by round
because of changes in partnership status and centers dropping out of the study.
2. The Child Care Center Partnership Data Set contains information on the child care
centers’ contracts with a local Head Start agency in Ohio and focuses on various
aspects of these contractual relationships. This partnership-level data set pertains to a
sub-sample of centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set mentioned above.
3. The Parent Data Set includes information collected from a self-selected sample of
parents on services their children have received and satisfaction with service quality.
This is parent level data, and thus it includes responses of several parents whose
children attended the centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set. Across the
three rounds of data collection, 1,691 parents completed parent surveys. The
respondents come from a wide range of geographical areas in Ohio. Roughly 33% of
respondents sent their children to urban centers, 42% were using suburban centers,
and 25% were from small towns or rural areas.
4. The Teacher Data Set includes information collected from the teachers working in
each center and focuses on their evaluation of the processes and experiences they
encounter at their workplace. This is teacher level data which includes responses of
several teachers in each center from the Child Care Center Data Set. Across the three
rounds of data collection, 408 self-selected teachers completed teacher surveys. The
teacher data also represent various locations in the state: 36% of the respondents
worked at urban centers, 41% were from suburban centers, and 23% were from
centers in small towns or rural areas.
Each data set includes pooled time-series data with up to three records for each organization (or
each partnership). First, we merged the first two data files by center IDs and wave indicators.
The centers with no Head Start contract were eliminated. Since the parent and teacher data
contained individual level data, we computed center-level aggregate measures for all variables
used from these data sets (by separately averaging the values of each variable at the center level)
and merged the teacher and parent data with the first two data files. Using the combined data set,
we tested the proposed models with OLS and ordered logit. Appendix 1 describes our measures.
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Dependent Variables. We use four measures of performance provided by different
constituencies: state government inspectors, center leadership, teachers and parents. Our first
measure is an interval-ratio variable measuring the “number of violations documented during the
state licensing inspection.” The ODJFS formally licenses private child care centers in Ohio and
conducts regular inspections of these facilities. The ODJFS’s child care regulations establish
minimum health, program and safety standards and cover license/approvals, staffing
requirements, grouping, space requirements, program equipment, policies/procedures,
safety/discipline, health, children’s records, nutrition, handwashing/diapers, and infant care. The
violations are assigned by state regulators and in our data the assigned values range from 0 to 49
with a large share of cases clustered around lower values.
The three remaining dependent variables are subjective assessments of a child care
center’s performance. The first subjective measure is based on directors’ responses to the
question: “How satisfied are you with the overall quality of your center?” (response categories
include: “very satisfied” (5), “somewhat satisfied” (4), “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” (3),
“not very satisfied” (2), and “not satisfied at all” (1). In the survey, each center director first
provided some background information on their center, such as teacher training and professional
development, parental involvement, center services, and center administration and organization.
The question on satisfaction with the center quality was strategically placed after these issues had
been discussed, and hence the answers can be expected to be informed by these complex
considerations. The second subjective measure is the teachers’ evaluation of overall center
quality. While the individual responses are at the ordinal level, an aggregate measure (centerlevel average) was created to reflect the average assessment of each center by all teachers
surveyed within a particular center. Our third subjective measure is based on parents’ evaluation
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of service quality. A center-level mean score of parents’ responses was created for each child
care center and used as a dependent variable in this analysis.
While our four dependent variables incorporate diverse viewpoints, they do not directly
measure the degree to which centers achieve essential goals of child care, such as the behavioral,
socialization, and educational growth of children. The measures available to us are limited to
assessing regulatory compliance and service quality, intermediate outcomes, rather than the
ultimate outcomes child care centers pursue. Future research should examine the impact that
independent variables included in this study have broader child care goals. For example,
scholars could assess children’s readiness for kindergarten as a measure of a child care center’s
effectiveness.
Independent Variables. The first group of independent variables includes several
measures of organizational capacity. Internal management practices is the sum of seven survey
items assessing various managerial activities. To capture human resource capacity of a center,
we include three measures: the proportion of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree, the proportion
of teachers with a Master’s degree and the student-teacher ratio. The first two human resource
capacity variables measure the quality of human resources. The third variable reflects their
quantity, which often translates into quality by allowing teachers to provide more individualized
attention to each child. The budget per student ratio is used to measure the availability of
financial resources within each child care center.
We included some additional measures of organizational characteristics. The total
annual operating budget and the average daily enrollment of preschoolers measure
organizational size. The two ownership measures are whether the child care center is nonprofit
and whether it is a faith-based organization. To measure the child care center’s external ties, we
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created a dummy variable indicating whether a center was a part of a larger agency or umbrella
organization. Finally, a set of variables reflects client demographics: the percentage of white
students and the percentage of subsidized students at each center.
We also incorporated numerous measures reflecting the contracting relationship between
Head Start agencies and the centers. We used two measures of relationship strength. Current
relationship strength is the mean of four variables: (1) shared procedures which reflect the
existence of formal and informal procedures governing the partnership, (2) goal agreement
which measures the contractors’ perception of both parties’ agreement on contract goals, (3)
communication quality which assesses the degree to which child care center directors believe
they maintain good communication with the local Head Start program, and (4) cooperation in
contract implementation which describes a variety of cooperative practices. To assess the
reliability of the scales for these four variables, we calculated Cronbach’s alphas. The results
show acceptable alpha scores ranging from 0.792 to 0.906. Finally, a composite current
relationship strength variable was created by calculating the mean of these four variables. This
measure characterizes the design of the contracting relationship at the time of the survey. In
addition, we account for the elements of relationship strength exhibited at the contract
development and specification stage. Since some aspects of strong relationships may be viewed
as “deference” in disguise due to the contractor’s power, information on the contractor’s input in
the specification process may also help separate the effect of the contractor’s power. We have
created a dummy variable collaborative contract development indicating whether the contract
was developed with input from both the local Head Start program and child care center. The
variable contract completeness measures the degree of specification in the contract. The last
variable focusing on the contract relationship in our model is relationship length. This variable
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is measured as the number of years a child care center has maintained the partnership with a
local Head Start agency.
Finally, we use a number of controls in each model. Since the partnerships we focus on
were studied over time, we separate the year fixed effects by including two dummies indicating
the wave of each survey record in all models. Recognizing the importance of geographical
conditions, we use a dummy variable indicating whether the center is in a “small town” or “rural
area” (as opposed to an “urban” or “suburban” area). The teachers’ model also includes the
following set of controls describing that constituency: benefits centers offer to teachers,
administrative support for teachers, and training opportunities for teachers. These measures are
the center-level mean scores of responses to questions on these respective topics. Lastly, the
parents’ model controls for parents’ age, parents’ participation in the classroom, intensity of
center use, Head Start client status, parents’ contribution to education at home, parents’
education level, and parents’ race. Like the controls in the teachers’ model, the control variables
in the parents’ model are computed by averaging the responses at each center.
Analysis. We ran four regression models: (1) the violations model where the dependent
variable is the number of regulatory violations for each child care center; (2) the directors’ model
where the dependent variable is child care center directors’ satisfaction with center quality; (3)
the teachers’ model where the dependent variable is the average center quality rating provided by
teachers; and (4) the parents’ model where the dependent variable is the average center quality
rating provided by parents. Each model analyzes the relationship between performance and
various independent variables. As mentioned above, the teachers’ and the parents’ models
include teacher specific or parent specific independent variables to control for the effects of
stakeholder characteristics on performance assessments. We analyzed the violations, teachers’
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and parents’ models using OLS regression. We used ordered logit to analyze the child care center
directors’ satisfaction because this dependent variable is ordinal.
Using survey data for testing a regression model always raises a legitimate concern for
common source bias. However, we believe that common source bias is not a significant threat to
the validity of our analysis. First and foremost, our data set is composed of data collected from
multiple sources. The data for the four dependent variables (i.e. violations, directors’ satisfaction,
teachers’ satisfaction, and parents’ satisfaction) were collected from a state agency, center
directors, teachers, and parents, respectively. Second, the management capacity variables,
except for the internal management practices variable, represent factual information about the
management practices in the centers rather than a subjective assessment of management quality.
Hence, these are not subjective measures per se. Third, among the four regression models we
tested, the directors’ satisfaction model is potentially most vulnerable to common source bias
because the same directors answered the survey questions related to center quality as well as
management capacity and contract relationship design. But again, since many of the measures
reported by center directors are either a description of organizational practices or characteristics,
the possible effect of common source bias on the findings for this model would be marginal.
Study Limitations. While our study has many strengths, including four different
measures of performance and a wide array of independent variables, it also has some limitations.
Child care center performance may be a function of a number of factors not included in our study
such as market competition (Milward and Provan 2000; Romzek and Johnston 2005), structural
differences in organizational configurations (Brewer and Selden 2000; Moynihan and Pandey
2005) and organizational culture and leadership styles (Boyne 2003; Brewer and Selden 2000;
Moynihan and Pandey 2005). Measures for these variables were not available from this data set.
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It is difficult to predict precisely how these omitted variables might bias our results particularly
because the literature on the effects of these factors on performance is very mixed (e.g., the
effect of competition on performance). Future research may seek to create a complementary data
set to overcome the concerns of omitted variable bias in this study.
FINDINGS
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. When comparing the results across the
four regression models, we find that the violations model shown in Table 3 has the smallest
number of significant variables. The student-teacher ratio, budget-student ratio, and percentage
of white students are all positively related to the number of regulatory violations identified by the
state inspectors. Note that the dependent variable is a negative measure of performance (i.e. the
higher number of violations, the worse the performance). A higher student-teacher ratio – i.e.,
fewer teachers at the center – is associated with more regulatory violations, which is not counterintuitive. But contrary to expectations, we find that higher budget-student ratios and higher
percentages of white students increase the number of violations a center has. Consistent with our
prediction, larger annual budgets, a proxy measure of organizational size, are associated with
fewer violations.7 Of the four significant variables in the model, the effect size of the studentteacher ratio is greatest.
<Table 2 and 3 about here.>
As shown in Table 4, several variables are significant in the directors’ model. Centers
with a higher proportion of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree have more satisfied directors.
7

An anonymous reviewer suggested that we use a fixed effect model to average out time invariant factors. We ran a
fixed effects regression by grouping the data by survey wave. The results show that the correlation between the
fixed effects and the other independent variables is only 0.099. The rho is also low at 0.031. The F-test failed to
reject the null hypothesis that all fixed effects are zero with the probability of 0.492. Hence, fixed effects are not a
concern in the violation model. We were not able to conduct a fixed effects analysis for the directors’ model
because the ordered logit fixed effects model was too complex to estimate. The results of the fixed effects
estimation for the teachers’ model and the parents’ model are similar to the violation model: the presence of fixed
effects was not confirmed.
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This variable also has the greatest effect size. In addition, the percentage of white students has a
positive association with perceived quality. But, the budget per student ratio is negatively
associated with directors’ satisfaction. Similar to the finding in the violations model, this
suggests that greater financial resources per student are correlated with decreased perceived
performance. Among the four contract relationship variables, an increase in contract
completeness decreases directors’ satisfaction. On the other hand, the coefficient of current
relationship strength is positive and significant. These two findings suggest that strong
relationships between Head Start and the provider rather than contract specification efforts
enhance directors’ satisfaction. For sensitivity analysis, in order to reduce the “halo effect”
associated with directors’ propensity to rate their service as satisfactory, we created a
dichotomous nominal variable coded as 1 for “very satisfied” and 0 for all other responses and
ran a logit analysis. Estimation results were almost the same between these two models except
for some differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients. Thus, a halo effect is not a concern in
this analysis.
< Table 4 about here.>
Table 5 suggests that a fairly diverse set of independent variables predict teachers’ ratings
of service quality. First, working at a center with a higher proportion of teachers with a
Master’s degree improves teachers’ assessments. On the other hand, teachers working at a center
affiliated with a larger agency or umbrella organization are less likely to be satisfied with their
center’s quality. In addition, two contract relationship variables are significant which was
contrary to our expectations of no impact. Collaboratively developing contracts has a negative
effect on teachers’ assessments, and relationship length is positively associated with teachers’
assessments. Among the three teacher-related control variables, teachers’ ratings of employee
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benefits and administrative support provided to teachers have significant positive effects on
perceptions of quality (with the latter variable having the largest effect size in the model).
<Table 5 about here.>
The broadest set of variables determines parents’ quality assessments as shown in the
first three columns of Table 6. Use of sound internal management practices is associated with
higher parent ratings of quality. On the other hand, parents whose children are attending
childcare centers affiliated with large umbrella organizations expressed lower satisfaction.
Parents’ assessments are also generally lower in schools with a greater percentage of white
students and with a greater percentage of subsidized students. Similar to the previous models,
we find that the strength and length of the partnerships between centers and Head Start agencies
both significantly improve parent ratings of care quality. Among the seven parental traits, the
intensity of child care service used and the percentage of white parents participating in the
survey have a positive effect on parents’ ratings of performance (with the latter variable having
the largest effect size in the model). Lastly, parents give higher quality ratings to centers located
in rural areas.
<Table 6 about here.>
Since parents are the end users of the service and their satisfaction, perhaps, more closely
describes child care outcomes, we also ran a fifth model as a sensitivity analysis, using parent
assessments as the dependent variable and including all the other quality assessments provided
by other constituencies as independent variables.8 This model examines how regulatory
8

The dependent variables in the other three models are added into the fifth model as independent models. Hence,
this sensitivity analysis may have an endogeneity problem: the number of violations, directors’ satisfaction, and
teachers’ satisfaction may be correlated with the errors, and the OLS estimates could be inconsistent and biased
(Gujarati, 1995). If that is the case, two stage least squares can be considered as an alternative estimation method
(Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 1993). We ran a Hausman test to figure out which method is preferred as suggested by
Wu (1973). The test result shows that 2SLS is not preferred to OLS. Based on the result, we report the findings
from the OLS estimation for the fifth model.
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violations as well as managerial and employee assessments correlate with clients’ satisfaction.
Among the three service quality measures, only teachers’ satisfaction is positively and
significantly related to parents’ assessments of service quality. We also find that as the studentteacher ratio increases, parent satisfaction declines. Findings related to organizational traits are
mostly consistent with the parents’ model without the endogenous variables except for the
insignificant effect of the percentage of subsidized students. None of the four contract
relationship variables appear to affect parents’ satisfaction with care quality. In addition,
intensity of service use and age of parents are positively associated with parents’ satisfaction.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study explores whether performance assessments of different organizational
stakeholders are influenced by various organizational and environmental factors. Overall, these
results confirm our expectation that different factors matter to different constituencies. Table 7
provides a summary of our findings and the effect sizes of significant variables.
<Table 7 about here.>
In Table 7, the scores of partial eta2 indicate the proportion of variability in the dependent
variable explained by the corresponding explanatory variable. The results show that some of the
teacher-related and parent-related control variables had a greater effect on assessments of center
quality than other significant variables in the models with these controls. In the parents’ model,
parents’ race and the intensity of child care service use were two of the three most influential
variables determining parents’ satisfaction with child care. In the teachers’ model,
administrative support for teachers had the greatest effect size with a magnitude of 0.536.

Hausman's Specification Test Results Comparing OLS to 2SLS
DF
Statistic
Pr > ChiSq
36
13.33
0.999
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Although due caution is necessary for interpreting the implications of relative effect sizes, these
findings might indicate that teachers and parents determine their satisfaction based upon what
they directly experience and observe in the service delivery process. In other words, constituents
located at the end of service delivery process pay less attention to what is going on behind the
management curtain.
Also as illustrated by Table 7, several contract relationship variables are significant.
Current relationship strength is associated with positive assessments of performance by directors
and parents. On the other hand, contract completeness has a negative association with director
evaluations of center quality. In addition, we find parent and teacher satisfaction increases as
contract length increases, and collaborative contract development decreases teacher satisfaction.
The interpretations of the significant contract relationship variables in the directors’
model are relatively straightforward. Contracting relationships that involve trust, shared goals
and clear communication empower leadership in contracted organizations, thereby improving
management’s satisfaction with organizational performance. This finding is consistent with the
growing literature on relational contracting that suggests strong contracting relationships can
have a range of positive effects (Brown et al. 2006; Lambright 2009; Van Slyke 2007). At the
same time, director satisfaction with center quality declines as contract specification increases.
The need to comply with additional administrative requirements entailed in more detailed
contracts may undermine directors’ perceptions of their own productivity and ability to focus on
the programmatic aspects of service delivery, which in turn lowers their satisfaction.
Our findings that contract relationship variables impact ratings by teachers and parents,
who are not directly involved in the partnership between the local Head Start program and child
care center, are intriguing. While parents and teachers are not in a position to assess and be
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directly influenced by the dynamics of the contracts, the relationship variables included in our
study may impact other factors in child care settings that are more readily observable by the
teachers and parents. This, in turn, may influence these constituencies’ performance assessments.
For instance, open lines of communication between the government and contractor may aid in
the speedy resolution of performance problems, resulting in improved parental satisfaction.
We also find that human resources are a significant predictor of several dimensions of
performance considered in our models. Our results specifically indicate that lower student-toteacher ratios improve regulatory compliance and that increased teacher training results in more
satisfied directors and teachers. The positive relationship between the student-to-teacher ratio
and the number of regulatory violations is not surprising since student-to teacher ratios are a
common focus for child care regulations. The other finding is more interesting and suggests that
it may be easier for teachers who are better educated to work with center leadership.
Another important finding is that nonprofit ownership does not impact performance
assessments made by teachers and parents. The literature on cross-sectional assessments of
performance in different service areas suggests that nonprofit organizations deliver higher
quality services compared to for-profits (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008; Morley 2006). Nonprofits’
reliance on private donations, volunteers, and their tax exempt status as well as the constraints on
compensation for organizational officers have been traditionally viewed as effective safeguards
against moral hazard and opportunistic behavior (Amirkhanyan 2010). However, our findings
pertaining to the field of child care fail to find any significant effect of sector. These nonfindings contribute to the ongoing discussion on whether government agencies should prefer
nonprofit service providers as a matter of policy or whether government agencies should apply
more stringent regulations to for-profit contractors.
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Among the findings that necessitate follow-up research is the negative impact that the
budget per student variable has on the regulatory violations and directors’ assessments of quality.
These results are interesting in the context of the ongoing debate in the education finance
literature on the effect of financial resources on education quality. While some argue that the key
issue is not the lack of resources but their effective and efficient use (Hanushek 1996), others
conclude that resource availability is an important predictor of student outcomes (Greenwald,
Hedges, and Laine 1996). Our study provides evidence that human resources, but not the
absolute amount of financial resources per student, affects stakeholders’ assessments of
performance. It is important to note that we use cross-sectional data, and hence reverse causality
cannot be ruled out: schools with regulatory violations and operational problems may receive
additional funding from various sources to help address these problems.
Finally, our findings indicate that the racial composition of the student body has a mixed
impact on performance assessments. While centers with a higher percentage of white students
have more satisfied directors, they also have higher numbers of regulatory violations and less
satisfied parents. The parents whose children attend predominantly white centers may expect
higher quality service than those who receive care in more diverse facilities. It is also possible
that the parents’ demands translate into tougher inspection standards (e.g., due to complaints and
demands for higher quality care) and hence more regulatory violations.
Certainly, more research is necessary in this area, but our study suggests that different
organizational and environmental factors influence different constituencies’ performance
assessments. Consistent with the Multiple Constituency Model (Connolly, Conlon, and Deutsch
1980), we conclude that focusing on a single measure reflecting one specific constituency’s
assessment of organizational work limits our understanding of organizational success and its
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determinants. Our findings also suggest that performance assessments are not independent: the
factors that improve the perceptions of internal stakeholders may indirectly affect the perceptions
of external stakeholders who received services from the “street-level” staff. In addition, these
findings may explain why program evaluation tools adopted to assess and eventually boost
organizational performance often fail. Tools that narrowly define organizational performance by
only focusing on its more objective aspects ignore the multi-dimensional nature of performance
and may fail to target important factors influencing performance. Thus, among other things, it
may be beneficial to widen the scope of government assessments of regulatory compliance in
order to gain more insight into the true impact of public and private organizations on their
communities.
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Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses
Performance Determinants

Number of
Violations

Performance Measures
Directors’
Teachers’
Satisfaction
Satisfaction

Management Capacity
Internal management practices
Negative
Positive
Teacher training No impact
Positive
Child care center student-teacher ratio
Positive
Negative
Financial resources
Negative
Positive
Organizational Traits
Size
Negative
No impact
Part of a larger organization
Negative
Negative
Nonprofit organization No impact
No impact
Faith-based organization No impact
Negative
Percent of white students
Negative
Positive
Percent of subsidized families
Positive
Negative
Contract Relationship
Completeness No impact
Negative
Current relationship strength No impact
Positive
Collaborative contract development No impact
Positive
Relationship length No impact
Competing
Note: Regulatory violations are a negative measure of performance
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Parents’
Satisfaction

Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive

Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

Negative
No impact
No impact
No impact

No impact
No impact
No impact
No impact

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

Dependent Variables
Number of violations

8.298

8.213

131

Directors' satisfaction

4.239

0.852

163

Teachers’ satisfaction

3.289

0.479

104

Parents’ satisfaction

3.418

0.317

125

29.808

31.744

163

16.157
1.681
9.564

24.133
7.501
2.574

157
154
163

Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)
Organizational Traits
Number of preschoolers
Annual budget($1000)

416.414

496.829

163

32.938
14.587

18.816
10.967

163
163

Part of a larger organization

0.436

0.497

163

Explanatory Variables
Management Capacity
Internal management practices
Human resources
Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree
Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree
Child care center student-teacher ratio
Financial resources

Nonprofit organization

0.466

0.500

163

Faith-based organization

0.172

0.378

163

Percent of white students

53.036

36.632

163

Percent of subsidized students

59.641

39.315

159

Completeness
Current relationship strength

6.399
3.667

1.648
0.832

163
158

Collaborative contract development

0.736

0.442

163

Relationship length

3.051

1.660

163

Teachers' benefits

3.263

2.060

104

Contract Relationship

Teacher Related Controls
Administrative support for teachers

8.250

1.277

104

Training opportunities for teachers

97.566

12.624

163

Parent Related Controls
Parents' age

28.723

5.473

125

Parents' participation in classroom

3.421

5.631

125

Intensity of center use

4.267

0.560

125

Percent of Head Start recipients

0.052

0.072

125

Parents' contribution to education at home

4.886

1.362

125

Parents' education level

2.947

0.707

125

Parents' race

67.095

36.463

125

Rural area
wave2
wave3

0.172
0.288
0.233

0.378
0.454
0.424

163
163
163

Control Variables
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Table 3. Violation Model (Dependent Variable=Number of Violations)
Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

P-value

-0.016

0.023

0.491

Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree

-0.049

0.029

0.095

Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree

-0.003

0.093

0.976

Child care center student-teacher ratio

0.738

0.312 *

0.020

0.254

0.128 *

0.049

Number of preschoolers

0.059

0.080

0.465

Management Capacity
Internal management practices
Human resources

Finance resources
Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)
Organizational Traits
Annual budget($1000)

-0.005

0.003 *

0.042

Part of a larger organization

-2.016

2.050

0.328

Nonprofit organization

-2.655

2.393

0.270

Faith-based organization

3.393

2.559

0.175

Percent of white students

0.052

0.025 *

0.044

Percent of subsidized students

-0.006

0.022

0.777

Completeness

0.362

0.534

0.500

Contract Relationship
Current relationship strength

1.110

0.979

0.260

Collaborative contract development

0.890

1.641

0.589

Relationship length

0.735

0.569

0.200

Rural area

-4.725

2.726

0.086

wave2

1.490

1.764

0.400

wave3

2.716

2.344

0.249

Intercept

-11.825

8.229

0.154

Controls

R-square

0.255

Adjusted R-square

0.110
118

N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 4. Directors’ Model (Dependent Variable = Directors’ Satisfaction)
Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

P-value

-0.001

0.005

0.924

Management Capacity
Internal management practices
Human resources
Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree

0.030

0.009 ***

<.001

Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree

0.041

0.029

0.153

Child care center student-teacher ratio

-0.103

0.077

0.183

-0.074

0.034

Number of preschoolers

-0.030

0.019

0.100

Finance resources
Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)

*

0.030

Organizational Traits
Annual budget($1000)

0.003

0.002

0.060

Part of a larger organization

0.810

0.477

0.089

Nonprofit organization

0.335

0.566

0.554

Faith-based organization

-0.211

0.559

0.706

Percent of white students

0.012

0.006

Percent of subsidized students

0.001

0.005

*

Completeness

-0.371

0.129

**
**

0.046
0.905

Contract Relationship
0.004

Current relationship strength

0.778

0.245

Collaborative contract development

-0.470

0.414

0.256

0.002

Relationship length

-0.274

0.146

0.0610.045

Rural area

-.0.617

0.592

wave2

0.890

0.432

wave3

0.854

0.554

0.123

Intercept5

0.208

1.740

0.905

Intercept4

2.613

1.758

Intercept3

4.232

1.808

*

0.019

Intercept2

5.401

1.910

**

0.005

Controls

44.64

LR chi-square

0.136145

Pseudo R-square

146

N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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0.297
*

0.039

0.137

Table 5. Teachers’ Model (Dependent Variable=Teachers’ Satisfaction)
Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

P-value

0.001

0.001

0.180

Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree

0.002

0.001

0.205

Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree

0.009

0.004*

0.017

Child care center student-teacher ratio

0.028

0.015

0.067

Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)

0.015

0.008

0.061

Number of preschoolers

0.002

0.003

0.4620.006

Management Capacity
Internal management practices
Human resources

Finance resources
Organizational Traits
Annual budget($1000)

-0.000

0.000

Part of a larger organization

-0.313

0.110**

0.170

Nonprofit organization

0.206

0.128

0.114

Faith-based organization

-0.111

0.100

0.269

0.0060.151

Percent of white students

0.002

0.001

0.170

Percent of subsidized students

-<.0001

0.001

0.921

Completeness

-0.038

0.021

0.080

Contract Relationship
Current relationship strength

0.085

0.047

0.076

Collaborative contract development

-0.245

0.078**

0.002

Relationship length

0.119

0.033**

0.001

Teacher Related Controls
Teachers' benefits

0.052

0.023*

Administrative support for teachers

0.240

0.027***

Training opportunities for teachers

-0.001

0.028
<.0001

0.003

0.851

Other Controls
Rural area

0.141

0.098

0.156

wave2

-0.104

0.082

0.208

wave3

-0.160

0.113

0.161

Intercept

0.399

0.456

0.384

R-square

0.747

Adjusted R-square

0.668
94

N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 6. Parents’ Models (Dependent Variable = Parents’ Satisfaction)
Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

P-value

Parameter Standard
Estimate
Error

P-value

Management Capacity
Internal management practices

0.002

0.001 *

0.012

0.001

0.001

0.296

Human resources
Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree

0.001

0.001

0.355

0.0004

0.001

0.736

Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree

-<.0001

0.003

0.871

-0.005

0.003

0.078

Child care center student-teacher ratio

-0.021

0.011

0.062

-0.031

0.013*

0.027

0.000

0.004

0.927

-0.004

0.007

0.546

Number of preschoolers

0..000

0.002

0.952

0.001

0.003

0.770

Annual budget($1000)

<.0001

<.0001

0.757

<.0001

0.000

0.513

Part of a larger organization

-0.283

0.082 *** 0.001

-0.354

0.110**

0.003

Nonprofit organization

0.150

0.096

0.123

0.176

0.172

0.313

Faith-based organization

0.048

0.087

0.5821

0.075

0.152

0.625

Percent of white students

-0.006

0.002 *** 0.0003

-0.005

0.002**

0.008

Percent of subsidized students

-0.002

0.001 *

0.014

-0.001

0.001

0.138

Completeness

-0.024

0.018

0.181

-0.003

0.018

0.845

Current relationship strength

0.113

0.036 **

0.002

0.063

0.038

0.103

Collaborative contract development

-0.123

0.063

0.053

-0.016

0.064

0.803

Relationship length

0.067

0.022 **

0.003

0.022

0.037

0.562

Parents’ age

-0.000

0.007

0.959

0.026

0.010**

0.008

Parents' participation in classroom

0.008

0.006

0.142

-0.001

0.009

0.892

Finance resources
Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)

Organizational Traits

Contract Relationship

Parent Related Controls

Intensity of service use

0.215

0.057 *** 0.000

0.365

0.095***

0.000

Percent of Head Start recipients

-0.221

0.396

0.577

0.441

0.509

0.392

Parents' contribution to education

0.004

0.024

0.850

0.022

0.025

0.384

Parents' education level

0.070

0.050

0.167

-0.074

0.061

0.236

Parents' race

0.007

0.002 *** <.0001

0.004

0.002

0.117

Number of violations

-0.005

0.004

0.268

Directors’ satisfaction

0.113

0.057

0.055

Teachers’ satisfaction

0.401

0.078***

Other Quality Measures

<.0001

Other Controls

R-square
Adjusted R-square
N

Rural

0173

wave2

-0.039

wave3
Intercept

-0.081
2.0931.746
0.597
0.474
112
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0.084 *

0.042

0.116

0.102

0.262

0.060

0.516

0.042

0.080

0.601

0.035 0.111104
-0.428
0.649
0.822
0.696
71

0.753
0.513

0.081
0.317
0.407 *** <.0001

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 7. Summary of Findings and Effect Sizes (partial eta2)
Models

Variables

Violation
Model

Directors’
Model

Teachers'
Model

Parents' Model
(without
quality
measures from
other models)

Management Capacity
Internal management practices

Positive
(.072)

Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree

Positive
(.076)

Proportion of teachers with a Master's degree
Child care center student-teacher ratio
Child care center budget-student ratio($1000)

Positive
(.078)
Positive
(.054)
Positive
(.039)

Negative
(.018)

Organizational Traits
Number of preschoolers
Annual budget($1000)

Negative
(.041)

Part of a larger organization

Negative
(.103)

Negative
(.124)

Nonprofit organization
Faith-based organization
Percent of white students

Positive
(.041)

Positive
(.012)

Negative
(.144)
Negative
(.068.)

Percent of subsidized students
Contract Relationship
Completeness

Negative
(.061)
Positive
(.039)

Current relationship strength
Collaborative contract development

Positive
(.106)
Negative
(.122)
Positive
(.157)

Relationship length

Positive
(.098)

Teacher Related Controls
Teachers' benefits

Positive
(.066)
Positive
(.536)

Administrative support for teachers
Training opportunities for teachers
Parent Related Controls
Parents’age
Parents' participation in classroom
Intensity of service use

Positive
(.143)

Percent of Head Start recipients
Parents' contribution to education
Parents' education level
Parents' race

Positive
(.166)
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Models

Variables

Violation
Model

Directors’
Model

Teachers'
Model

Parents' Model
(without
quality
measures from
other models)

Other Controls
Rural

Positive
(.048)

Note: Effect sizes (partial eta2) were estimated by using a Stata program, regeffectsize. Partial eta2 is the proportion
of variance in the dependent variable attributable to the corresponding explanatory variable (Cohen, 1973). In the
analysis section, the directors’ model was estimated using ordered logit. However, effect sizes reported for the
directors’ model in this table were estimated using OLS.
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Appendix 1. Dependent and Independent Variables
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Number of violations: Number of violations documented during state licensing inspections
Director's satisfaction: How satisfied are you with the overall quality of your center? (5= Very satisfied
4=Somewhat satisfied 3=Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 2= Not very satisfied 1= Not satisfied at all)
Teachers assessment of quality: How would you rate the overall quality of this child care center? (4= Excellent 3=
Good 2= Fair 1= Poor)
Parental quality assessment: How would you rate the overall quality of your child’s care at this center? (4=
Excellent 3= Good 2= Fair 1= Poor).
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
Internal management practices (Cronbach alpha=0.777): Sum of seven dichotomous survey items. Please
indicate the average number of times someone in an administrative role at your center, such as an education
coordinator, administrator, or senior teacher, engages in the following activities during a typical month: (1)
observes teachers in the classroom to assess their practice; (2) meets with teachers to provide feedback regarding
their teaching practices in the classroom; (3) meets with teachers to discuss how to link the curriculum to children's
developmental needs; (4) discusses with teachers strategies to ensure teaching practice is developmentally
appropriate; (5) discusses with teachers strategies to ensure a literacy-rich curriculum; (6) reviews teachers'
teaching; and (7) reviews program data to see how the center is doing compared to specific goals or objectives.
Proportion of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree: Sum of number of teachers with a Bachelor's degree in early
childhood or another field divided by the total number of teachers currently working at the center.
Proportion of teachers with a Master’s degree: Sum of number of teachers with a Master's degree or higher in
early childhood or another field divided by the total number of teachers currently working at the center.
Child care center student-teacher ratio: Ratio of preschoolers to teachers or teaching aides at the center
Child care center budget-student ratio: Ratio of the child care center’s budget (unit= $1000) to the number of
preschoolers served by the center
ORGANIZATIONAL TRAITS
Contractor part of a larger organization: Coded as 1 for centers part of a larger agency or umbrella organization
Contractor’s organizational size: Average daily enrollment of preschoolers at the child care center (numeric)
Contractor’s budget: Child care center's current total annual operating budget (unit=$1000)
Nonprofit contractor: Coded as 1 for nonprofit child care centers
Faith-based contractor: Coded as 1 for faith-based organizations
Contractor in the rural area: Survey item “urbanicity” (1=Urban 2= Suburban 3=Small Town 4=Rural ) was
coded as 1 for small towns and rural areas and 0 for other responses.
Percent white: Percent of white preschoolers at the center
Percent of subsidized students: Percent of students receiving subsidies at the center
CONTRACT RELATIONSHIP
Completeness: Sum of the following survey items measured as dichotomous nominal variables: (1) currently do
you have a written legal agreement or a contract with Head Start?; (2) do you regularly update the document?; (3)
does this agreement specify the maximum number of children who can receive Head Start enhanced services at your
center?; (4) in your partnership with Head Start, do you have a written document that describes roles and
responsibilities of Head Start and of people at your center in providing services?; (5) do you have any documents
that describe the partnership's goals and specific actions that the partnership plans to take to achieve the goals?; (6)
in your partnership, do you have any written documents that state what your program needs to do to meet Head Start
Program Performance Standards?; (7) do you have documents describing procedures for communicating with your
Head Start partner?; and (8) do you have a well-defined process for recruiting and enrolling children into your center
for Head Start enhanced services?
Current relationship strength: Mean of variables “shared procedures,” “goal agreement,” “communication
quality,” and “cooperation in contract implementation”
Shared procedures (Cronbach alpha=0.906): Sum of the eight survey items measured on a 5 point Likert scale.
The partnership between my child care center and Head Start has: (1) a process for ensuring child care staff have a
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good understanding of Head Start, (2) a process to ensure staff understand Head Start regulations, (3) procedures for
resolving conflicts or differences across your programs, (4) ensured that child care staff are prepared for their new
responsibilities, (5) ensured that all staff are involved in all phases of partnerships, (6) procedures to keep children in
the program if their parents lose eligibility for child care subsidy, (7) procedures to keep children in the program if
their parents lose eligibility for Head Start services, and (8) procedures to manage finances as part of the partnership.
Goal agreement (Cronbach alpha=0.875): Sum of four survey items measured on a 5 point Likert scale: (1) the
partnership between my child care center and Head Start has a shared partnership philosophy and vision; (2) the
partnership between my child care center and Head Start has agreement about the curriculum/educational approach;
(3) the partnership between my child care center and Head Start has agreements or plans that help guide the
partnership work; and (4) my center and HS have similar goals for our work together.
Communication quality (Cronbach alpha=0.792): Sum of three survey items measured on a 5 point Likert scale:
(1) the partnership between my child care center and Head Start has good communication within and across your
organizations; (2) I feel my voice is heard in the Partnership; and (3) I feel I can pick up the phone and call the HS
program.
Cooperation in contract implementation (Cronbach alpha=0.827): Sum of five survey items measured on a 5
point Likert scale: (1) individuals involved in the partnership between my child care center and Head Start
demonstrate mutual respect for one another; (2) I feel my program is a full partner with the HS program; (3) I feel
the HS program respects my Program; (4) I feel HS does not really view my center as a partner; and (5) how would
you characterize your partnership with Head Start on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=just forming and 5=fully
established?
Collaborative contract development: Coded as 1 when the contract was developed with input from the HS
program and child care center
Relationship length: Number of years that the center has engaged in the partnership
TEACHER RELATED VARIABLES
Benefits for teachers: First, we coded each of the following benefits that an individual teacher indicated receiving
as a 1: (1) paid vacation, (2) paid sick leave, (3) paid maternity leave, (4) paid family leave, (5) paid health
insurance, (6) paid dental insurance, (7) tuition reimbursement, (8) retirement plan, (9) release time for training, and
(10) other benefits. Next, we calculated the sum of the positive answers for each teacher respondent. Third, we
aggregated the summed responses by center and divided it by the number of respondents per center.
Administrative support for teachers: First, we summed the positive responses to the following statements by each
teacher respondent regarding whether they: (1) have enough time to do all that is required, (2) have clearly defined
job responsibilities, (3) have a high enough salary for job demands, (4) get support from other staff, (5) get support
from their supervisor, (6) get support and communication from management, (7) get enough funds for supplies and
activities, (8) have opportunities to give input to management for changes, (9) have clear goals and objectives for
teaching, (10) have a staff handbook at the center, (11) have a center director not afraid of taking risks, and (12)
have a collective bargaining agreement at the center. Second, we aggregated the summed responses by center and
divided it by the number of respondents per center.
Training opportunities for teachers: Percent of center’s preschool teachers who receive training annually
PARENT RELATED VARIABLES
Parents' age: Mean age of parents
Parents' participation in classroom: Mean of the frequencies that parents volunteer in the classroom (times per
year)
Intensity of service use: Mean of average days per week that children attend the center
% of Head Start recipients: Percentage of parents who receive support from Head Start
Parents' contribution to education at home: Mean number of times books are read to children at home per week
Parents' education level: Mean education level of parents (1= no diploma 2= high school diploma/GED 3= trade
license or certificate 4=associates degree 6=graduate degree)
Parents' race: White parents as a percent of all parents participating in the survey for each center
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